hanges in commercial bank market shares of fwtn debt are decomposed into portfolio decisions, loanable funds availability and loan market size for 64 counties in Arkansas from 1986 through 1990. A seemingly unrelated regression model is hypothesized to identify county characteristics that are related [o changes in commercial bank make{ shares, Regression results indicate that county differences in economic activity, the rela[ive risk associated with agriculture, farm structure and regional location contributed to changes in commercial bank market shares. The results imply a market nichc for rural cormnercial banks emphasizing agricultural loans in the presence of unlimited branch banking.
Commercial banks are currently the largest institutional lenders to the farm sector and have dramatically increased them market share of total farm debt since 1981, Factors influencing changes m market share over time and across regions in Arkansas are identified in this study. The extent to which changes in commercial bank lending to agriculture are associated with county economic, demographic and structural characteristics are investigated.
Previous studies conccrncd with changing market share of nonreal estate farm debt arc summarized in Wilson and Barkley (WB) . Like WB, the study presented here is interested in explaining changes in commercial bank market share over time (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and across regions as opposed to changes that are the result of macroeconomic effects.
However, the study presented here differs from WB'S in several ways. First, WB analyzed differences in changing market share across states, whereas the study presented here analyzes differences in changing market share across counties, and therefore, at a lCSSaggregated lCVC1. Second, since the present study analyzes changes in commercial bank market share for one state, Arkansas, differences in banking regulation among states need not be considered here, although structural differences between rural and urban counties are, Third, WB explained changes in commercial bank market share of nonreal estate farm debt as opposed to total (nonreal estate plus real estate) farm debt as is done here. Fourth, WB explained changes in commercial bank market share during a period of declining market share, whereas the study presented here considers a period of commercial bank market share growth. Finally, the present study uses a more efficient estimator than
The increase in the national, total farm loan market share by commercial banks is primarily the result of an increase m real estate farm debt held by commercial banks. Other lenders' farm real estate loan portfolio decreased.
More stringent loan collateral requirements have incremcd the use of commercial bank revolving lines of credit backed by real estate.
Hence, the increased collateral requirements have shifted loans into the real estate category even though the loans may be for nonreal estate purposes (USDA, 1993) .1 As a result, this study does not differentiate between nonreal estate and real estate farm debt as did WB since categorical differences have diminished.
The farm debt owed to the five major U.S. farm lender categories -commercial banks, Farm Credit System (FCS), Farmers Home Admmistration (FrnHA), life insurance companies and individuals and others -has dramatically declined from a 1984 peak of $193,782 million to $139,663 million in 1992, or a 28 percent decline (USDA, 1993) . The bulk of the decline is attributable to the FCS, FrnHA and individuals and others while commercial banks experienced a net increase in farm loans, As a result, the market share of individual lender categories varied throughout the 1980s, For example, commercial banks, currently the largest agricultural lender, increased market share from a low of21 percent in 1981 to a high of37 percent m 1992 while the FCS lost market share from its peak of 34 percent in 1982 to 26 percent in 1992 as shown in figure 1. The FmHA market share increased from 11 percent in 1980 to 16 percent m 1987 before retreating to 10 percent in 1992. Individuals and others decreased their market share continuously during the 1980s from 28 percent to 20 percent before experiencing modest gains since 1990, and life insurance companies' market share remained stable at approximately seven percent. Figure 2 demonstrates that Arkansas agricultural lenders experienced a similar pattern of changes in farm debt market share (Ahrendsen, Priyanti and Dixon) .
The study is organized M follows. The first section reviews the regulatory enwronment for agricultural lending in Arkansas.
The second section discusses the methodology, model, estimation approdch and data used, The following section presents and interprets the estimated model, Finally, concluding comments are presented.
Agricultural Lending Environment in Arkansas
The regulations governing bdnk operation can have a sizable impact on banks' market share of a particular type of loan. Wilson and Barkley considered differences in the structure of bank systems (unit versus branch banking) among states m thtxr study. Although bank regulations did not vary from county to county in the study presented here, regulatory changes during the 1986 through 1990 study period were considered.
In 1988 legislation was pdssed to allow county-wide brdnch banking as of January 1, 1989, branch banking to contiguous courmes as of Jantmry 1, 1994 and statewide branch banking as of January 1, 1999. The relaxing of branch banking regulations to countywide branch banking had a mininml, if any, affect on the commercial bank rndrket share of agricultural loans for this study since market share daVdwere aggregated to the county level and much of the county-wide branch banking occurred after the cnd of the study, Arkansas usury limits since 1982 have been the Federal discount rate plus 500 basis points. Although one of the most restrictive usury laws in the United States, the law has had a mimmal impact on the number of agricultural loans banks grant. From a survey of western Arkansas bankers, Dixon, Ahrcndsen and Barry found that few additional agricultural loans would bc granted without usury, While usury constrains the amount of loan risk pricing a bank may undertake, FCS, for example, is not NtbJeCtto usury and rndy risk price marginal loans. However, FCS has been interested in highquality loans which have not required risk premiums. Thus, usury has likely had a minirndl, if any, impdct on market share during the study period.
Methodology and Data
Wilson and 13arkleydeveloped a model to explain changes In market share over time. In this paper their methodology is used to analyze the market share of Arkansas cornrnercid banks for the aggregate of nonrcal estate and real estate agricultural loans. First, the percentage change in 432 Ahrendsen, Diron and J+ vatz(r Growth VI Agricultural Loan Market Share 
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By dividing (2) by (1), rearranging terms and multiplying by 100, a percentage change in commercial banks' market share can be expressed as:
where 100 The percentage change in agricultural loanto-deposit ratio (PCALDR) measures the change in the portfolio decision of a commercial bank. Commercial banks service all sectors of the economy, and a decision must be made as to what proportion of the loan fhnds will be allocated to agrlcultuml borrowers, other businesses, consumers or industry, In addition, commercial banks must allocate deposits among loans and alternative investments such as government securities, municipal bonds, agent y bonds and reserves, The percentage change in bank deposits (PCBL)) measures the change in fund availability, Commercial banks have relied extensively on local deposits as the principal source of funds to finance their assets. In some periods growth in local deposit volume, particularly for rural banks, has not kept pace with the growth in aggregate demand for loans, However, there are sources of funds from outside the local deposit market that banks may access such as loan participation with correspondent banks, the seasonal borrowing privilege from Federal Reserve Banks and loan origination for The Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac) and other secondary markets, Thus, a rural bank may not have sufficient local funds to meet its goals in agricultural lcndmg, but funds can be made available from other sources, Loan participations are quite common among banks. In fact, Arkansas Bankers Bank was chartered in 1990 for the sole purpose of prowding these and other correspondent banking services. However, tht! seasonal borrowing privilege and Farmer Mac have been utilized lo a much lesser extent. The seasonal borrowing privilege, which has been m existence since 1973, was used by no more than 20 percent of the banks in Arkansas in any given year from 1985 through 1990 (Clark) , Activity in the Farmer Mac seconda~market by banks in Arkansas was negligible during the sample period. One reason for the pmt and current limited use of Farmer Mac is that banks have had sufficient funds available to finance their assets.
The percentage change in total agricultural loans outstanding (F'CTAL) indicates the changes in loan market size, lending activities of all lenders and overall demand for Farm loans, Thus, PCTAL indicates the change in relatlve volume of farm loans.
Equation (3) IS an identity because it is derived from ( 1) which is a definition, The WB approach explains variation In market share by explaimng the variation in PCAIJIR, PCBD and K'Z4L, Each of the three components of change can be modelled as a dependent vanablc to yield a system of three equations such as: PCALDR, = aO + al PCNFI, + azPCFI, + a31USK, + GJbPOP, + a5BANK, + a6MSA, + e, (4) PCBD, = h,, + blPCNFI, + bzPC171 + bTPO1 ', + bbBANK, + bfPCUN, + b6MSA, + 1{, (5) PCTAL, = co + CIPCFI, + c~POP, + c, PCSIZ1<,
where PCALDR,, PCBD1 and PCTAL, are the observations on the percentage changes for the ith county.
The independent variables in (4) -(6) are defined m table 1. These varlablcs represent the demand for agricultural loans, demand for nonagricultural loans, the relative risk associated with agricultural lending, bank competition, farm structure and bank location,z
The variables selected to explain changes in the demand for agricultural loans are the percentage change in farm income (PCF~and the ratio of the percentage change in the number of farms to the percentage change in total population
The demand for nonagricultural loans is captured by the percentttge change in nonfarm income (PCNFI) and the percentage change in the unemployment rate (PCUN) . These variables are demand shifters.
It is hypothesized that PCI'I is positively related to the PCALDR, PCBD and PCTAI.. As farm income increases, farming N more profitable and farmers are more likely to demand farm loans to finance farm investments as well as having more finds to deposit, POP as a local market demand variable is also expected to be positively related to the three dependent variables. The change in the number of farms relative 10 total population indicates the change in the relative demand for agricultural loans by farmers m the county. The PCNFZ is expected to be nc@ively related to PCALDR and positively related PCBD. As nonfiarm income increases, demand for nonfarm loans (commercial and consumer) and bank dcposlts increase. In addition, PCUN as an indicator of the growth of a county's economic vita]lty 1s hypothesized to bc negatively related to PCBD.
In equation (4), RISK measures the risk associated with nonfiarm lores relative to farm loans. RISK is the ratio of the coefficient of variation of nonfmm income to the coefficient of variation of Farm income. Commcrclal banks are conccrncd with the rwk associated with their loan portfohos and, thus, the underlying variation in nonfarm income and farm income. Commercial banks can diversify their loan portfolios by lending to different sectors of the economy, but certain sectors may be more risky than others. As this nsk differential mcreams, a banker must reevaluate the loan portfolio and make adjustments, Hence, RISK N expected to be positively related to PCALDR since increases in farm income risk, ceteris paribz.u, make RISK decline.
The degree of bank competition is measured by the number of banks per county
This measure assumes farmers have uniform access across Arkansas to other agricultural lenders such as the FCS, Changes m the size and structure of farms are reflected by the percentage change in average farm size (PCSIZE) and the percentage change in the value of land and bu]ldings (PC VAL). These two variables are related to the changes in real estate and fixed asset purchases, which should be positively related to PCTAZ,. A measure of the diversification opportunities for a commercial bdnk is the degree of a county's rurality. A rural county is likely to have a large proportion of agricultural lwdns to total loans, The U.S. office of Management and Budget designates ten Arkansas counties as metropolitan statistical areas (MSAS) observation comes from one of these ten urban counties, and O otherwise.
The coefficients in (4) -(6) are estimated using Zellner's seemingly unre~dted regression (SUR) as opposed to ordinary least squares which was used by WB, SUR is used to gain more efficient estimates since the error terms (e,, u, and v,) in these different cqwations arc likely to reflect some common unmeasurable or omitted faciors and, therefore, are contemporaneously correlated (Judge et al.) . SHAZAM (White et al.) is used to obtain all estimates.
Daia and Sources
The data used to construct variables are drawn from several sources: U. Initially, SUR was used on the full sample with all 75 counties to estimate (4) -(6), Results indicated a geneml lack of significance of the three equations at the 1 and 5 percent levels. The R2S of the regression equations were also low, approximately 7 percent, respectwel y, for each Ahrendser7, l) Li-OfI and W)wt71 [ Growth III Agrlcul(ural Loan Market Share cquatmn. In addition, only a Icw of' the mdlvidual parameters were statistically dlf[crcnt from zero.
As a result of the unsatisfactory results, outlicr identification (discussed below) and other diagnostic procedures (dlscusscd later) were performed to assess the reliability of the model.
Eleven
counties were identified as statistical outliers, These countlcs were Boone, Calhoun, Cleveland, Columbia, Dallas, Grant, IIot Spring, Independence, Marion, ouachlta and Sharp, They were omitted from the sample used to estimate (4) -(6), The PCAI,DR for Cleveland County is undclincd since this county reported no agricultural loans m 1986. Marion County had an extreme]y large RZSK value (3 1.7), [t is unreasonable LO expect that the coefficient of vanatlon in nonfarm income is thirty-one times larger Lhanthe coefficient of variation in farm income. The other mnc outlier counties were detected by identifying counties whose rcslduals from the estimation of (4) Thus, the outl iers were identified using equation (4). Homoskcdasticity for the three component equations (4) - (6) is not rejected at the 0,01 significance level for each regression equation. Thus no steps arc taken in the SUR approach to compensate for heteroskedasticity.
A preliminary specification was estimated with regional binary variables representing the rural coastal, delta and highland counties. However, the Impact of these regions was not as J Agr. and Applied Econ,, Decetnber, 1994 
Final Estimation Results and Discussion
To obtain greater efficiency, equations (4) -(6) with PCF/, omitted were estimated by SUR using the sample with 64 observations. The implications of the estimated equations are now discussed.
Portfolio Decision (PCALDR)
The SUR estimates of equation (4) The estimated coefficient of percentage change in nonfarm income (PCNFI) is unexpectedly positive and significant at the 0,10 level. A similar unexpected result was found by Pederson, It was expected that increases in nonfarm income would indicate increased demand for nonagricultural loans, implying a decrease in the agricultural loan-todeposit ratio. In addition, commercial banks may prefer to lend more to nonfarm activities since repayment capacity is likely to increase because of increases in nonfarrn income, However, a positive relationship between PCNFI and PCALDR can be explained, Suppose nonfarm income is not growing as fast as farm income, Then commercial banks may choose to lend to sectors with the highest rate of income growth. This may be true for Arkansas, since average county farm income grew 65 percent, compared with the 5 percent growth in average county nonfarm income during the study period.
PCNFI also is significantly and positively related to PCBD in equation (5), This implies increases in nonfarm income increme bank deposits. If the best lending opportunities are in agriculture and there are limited lending opportunities in other sectors, then commercial banks would invest the additional bank deposits in farm loans, which results in an increase m the agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio.
The sign of the RISK coefficient in the PCALDR equation is unexpectedly negative and significant at the 0.05 level, Wilson and Barkley 's risk variable was not significantly related to PCALDR. The negative parameter estimate on the RZSK variable implies that the agricultural loan-todeposit ratio rises with increases in relative risk of farm business income. This counterintuitive result can be explained by a number of reasons. Arkansas is primarily characterized by rural areas and these depend more on the agricultural economy than urban areas, Rural banks experienm high risks in agricultural lending primarily as a result of variability in farmers' incomes and limited opportunities for banks to diversify assets, Since farm income growth during the study period exceeded nonfarm income growth, commercial banks, especially in rural areas, may have chosen to invest in risky assets like agricultuml loans because the fast growth in farm income may be associated with expected high agricultural prolits.
Ahrend.sq DI run and PIYvan[t Growth m Agrtculwral Loan Market Share
Robison and Barry cite a survey conducted by the American Bankers Association that identified bankers' probable changes in the agricultural loanto-deposit ratio if farm lending became more risky. Only 38 of 119 bankers responding to the survey indicated a likely reduction in Pm-mlending, and 24 bankers indicated an increase m fiirm lending.
Cross-checking of answers for other risk responses, such as increases m interest rates, security requirements and degree of supervision of farm loans, confirms lenders responding to risk in ways other than denying loans. As an example, of the 81 bankers who would not reduce farm lending, 48 reported they would increase interest rates on farm loans as a risk response.
Unfortunately, data regarding such commercial bank risk responses are not available for the present analysis.
The proportion ofthc growth in the number of farms to growth in total population (POP) in each county is used as a proxy for agricultural loan demand relative to consumer loan demand. As expected, the coefficient estimate on POP is posltlve. Thus, counties having large growth in the number of farm relative to total population growth cxpcrlenced greater growth in agricultural loan-todeposit ratios than counties having small growth in the number of farms relative to total population growth, Bank officers and loan committees made decisions to support the greater agricultural loan demand in those counties. This result is consistent with the results found by WB and Betubiza and Leatham.
A proxy for bank competition is measured by the number of banks in each county in 1990 (lL4AK).~The negative parameter estimate on BANK implies that as there are more banks in a county, the agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio decreases. Counties with more banks probably experienced greater opportunities for loan diversification from 1986 to 1990 than did counties with fewer banks, Thus, banks facing greater within-county competition lowered their emphasis on agricultural lending.
The negative parameter estimate for urban areas (A&f) indicates urban commercial banks increased their agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio at a much slower rate, or decreased their agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio (de-emphasized agricultural lending) at a much faster rate, than rural commercial banks, This is not surprising because the more urban an area, the more diverse are the lending opportunit~es. Thus, commercial banks appear to diversify out of agriculture as long as diversification opportunities are available, Moreover, rural banks are more likely to [end more money to agriculture relative 10 their deposits than urban banks do because rural banks are more dependent on farm activities. Another reason for the inverse relationship between PCALDR and A4SA may be that urban bdnk management has not maintained the past levels of agricultural lending expertise and commitment to agriculture.
Loanable Funds Availability (PCBD)
SUR coefficient estimates of eqwation (5) explaining variation in percentage change of bank deposits (PC13D) have only one coefi'lclent significant at 0.10, that of percentage change in nonfarm income (PCNFI) .
The coefficient of determination for the PCBD equation is 0.09. Additional analysis shows that variation in PCBD explains relatively little variation in PCfWS compared with PC'ALDR. Thus the lack of regressor sigmficance N not particularly troublesome for this study.
Loan Market Size (PCTAL)
All of the SUR coefficient estimates in (6) explaining variation in percentage change of total agricultuml loans (F'CTAL) are significantly different from zero at either the 0.05 or 0.01 level except the coefficient of PCSIZE.
Also, the coefficient estmuatcs have their anticipated signs. The coefficient of determirmtion for the F'CTAL equation is 0.22.
Growth in number of farms relative to a county's population is represented by the POP variable, The positive parameter estimate on POP indicates that the greater the percentage change in the number of farms relative to the percentage chdnge in the total population, the higher the percentage changc in total agricultural loans outstanding. Thus, a relatively large decrease m the number of [arms in a county indicates that the agricultural sector has become a less important part of the county's economy and that there is less demand for agricultural loans.
The overall decrease in loan market size from 1984 through 1990 is consistent with the general perception of weak farm loan demand during the last fcw years of this pcrlod, Farm loan demand was weak because farmers, in general, were concerned with decreasing their debt levels and were pcrccl vcd to be more risk averse regarding debt, Weak farm loan demand affects all lenders, and thus, the total loan market size is reduced.
The posltivc parameter estimate on PCVAL indicates that increases in farmland and property values are associated with higher agricultural loans outstanding. Bctubiza and Lcatham showed that a farm located in an area with higher farmland and property values has greater collatcml value, and thus, a firm can support a higher level of loans. An increase in property values, ceteris puribus, decreases the financial risk of the firms so that Icndcrs are likely to grant more loans and farmers are likely to request more loans.
Ahrend.ven, Dixon and Pryanti. Growth WIAgrlcultutal Lnon Markef Share The negative parameter est~rmte for urban areas (JAW) implies that urban areas experienced larger declines in total agricultural lotms outstanding than dld rural areas Urban areas are characterized by large financial inst~tutions that can lend to many businesses in a variety of industries. Therefore, the relatively small concentration of farm loans among large urban financial institutions may reflect an opportunity for these institutions to lend to nonfarm businesses. This reasoning is supported by the evidence presented by Barkley, Mellon and Potts; and Gilbert and Belongia, other possible explanations for the inverse relationship between PCTAL and A4SAare: significant levels of urban growth displace agriculture in urban counties; and just as with the relationship of PCALDR to A4SA, urban bank management may not have maintained their historical level of agricultural lending expertise and commitment.
Concluding Comments
Changes in commercial bank market shares of farm debt were decomposed into portfolio decisions, loanable funds availabdity and loan market size.
In general, commercial banks increased the proportion of agricultural loans in their portfolio. Commercial banks had ample loan fimds available to service the demand for farm debt. Decreased loan market size, primardy a result of decreased loan demand by farmers, affected all agricultural lenders, but commercial banks were affected to a lesser extent than other lenders.
Factors affecting the three components (portfolio decision, loan funds availability and loan market size) of percentage change in commercial banks' market share were identified. The percentage change in nonfarm income had a significant impact on the changes in the agricultural loan-to-deposit mtio as well as total bank deposits, Since nonf%rmincome growth was slower than farm income growth, bank management revested more money in agriculture by granting more agricultural loans, Hence, the agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio increased even though farm income was more variable than nonfarm income. Results demonstrate that the growth in the number of farms relative to total population growth in an Arkdnsas county hdd a significant impact on the changes in the agricultural Ioan-to-deposit ratio as well as loan market srz,c. This lrnphes thdt structural and demographic effects have an impact on the demand for agricultural loans. in addition, the decrease in agricultural asscl values was associated with dccreascd loan market size because Icss collateral was available to secure loans and lower credit reserves were available for farmers whale at the same time mcrcasing [inancial risk, Also a county being urban led to lower agricultural loan-to-deposit ratio levels and lower total agricultural loans from 1986 to 1990 than a county being rural.
While the variation in bank deposit changes was not strongly associated with hypothesized regressors, changes in deposit availability explained little of the market share variation. The secondary markets for farm real esvate and rural housing mortgages (Farmer Mac I) and FmI-IA guaranteed portions of operating and farm ownership lores (Farmer Mac II) diminish the dependency of commercial banks on bank deposits M a source of loan funds. However, loan funds availability has not been a limiting factor in the growth of commercial banks market share of farm loans, Commercial banks have other options available, such as loan participations and the seasonal borrowing privilege, that allow them to have adequate funds available to satisfy loan derndnd. Thus, the success of Farmer Mac appears to depend more on lenders' need to reduce risk than to incrcasc liquidity by selling lcxansin the secondary market,
The deregulatory trend towdrd unlimited branch banking in Arkamas and other states may have an impact on commercial banks' market share of farm loans, Gilbert and 13elongia; and Lawrence and Klugman have found that rural banks controlled by urban-based banks have proportionately fcw agricultural loans.
The study presented here provides significant evldencc that a commercial bank located in an urban county hm a propensity to grmt a lower proportion of agricultural loans than a commercial bank located in a rural county, Possible explanations for these results are that rural banks controlled by urban-based banks have more opportunities for loan diversification and urban bank rnmagemcnt may not feel lts comparative advantage is in agricultural lending, CIivcn these results and explanations, to the extent that unlimited branch banking wdl be dommatcd by urban-bawd banks and their lending practices, branch banks associated banks emphasizing agricultural loans or employment with the urban banks may grant fewer agricultural of personnel with agricultural finance expertise by loans relative to other loans in rural areas, This rural branches of urban banks. might portend a market niche for rural commercial
